Channon S. Singh v. The State of Utah : Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Channon S. Singh v. The State of Utah : Petition for
Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys
for Respondent.
Ronald S. Fujino; Charles F. Loyd, Jr.; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Certiorari, Singh v. Utah, No. 910514.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3730
15.9 
UOCKET NO, r- L 
IN THEf'StrPRlME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHANNON S. SINGH, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Supreme Court. ,„_,,„, 
CaSe No. QtDy/H 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900497-CA 
Priority No, 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OP CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari arises out of an 
appeal from a judgment and conviction for five counts of Forgery, 
all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501 (3) (a) (1990), with one count enhanced pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1001, -1002 (1990) (habitual criminal), in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR. 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Appellant/Petitioner 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for 
Appellee/Respondent 
F I L E D 
NOV 1 4 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHANNON S. SINGH, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900497-CA 
Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari arises out of an 
appeal from a judgment and conviction for five counts of Forgery, 
all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501(3)(a) (1990), with one count enhanced pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1001, -1002 (1990) (habitual criminal), in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR. 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Appellant/Petitioner 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for 
Appellee/Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 11 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 1 
JURISDICTION 2 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. "LEGAL EFFICACY" OR THE REQUIREMENT OF 
APPARENT COMPLETENESS IS REOUIRED BY THE FORGERY 
STATUTE. 5 
POINT II. PETITIONERS REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN. 10 
A. The "Attempted Forgery" Instruction 
Should Have Been Given 12 
B. The "Prohibited Use of a License" 
Instruction Should Have Been Given 15 
C. The "Theft by Receiving Stolen Property" 
Instruction Should Have Been Given 17 
REASONS JUSTIFYING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 18 
CONCLUSION 19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Floyd v. Western Surgical Assocs.. 773 P.2d 401 (Utah 
App. 1989) 9, 16 
Helmuth v. Morris. 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979) 9, 16 
Keeble v. United States. 412 U.S. 205 (1973) 17 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214 
(Utah 1984) 9, 16 
State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) 11, 12, 13 
16, 17, 18 
State v. Brown. 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984) 14 
State V. Burks. 29 Utah 2d 378, 510 P.2d 532 (1973). . . 15 
State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986) 11, 12, 16 
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 10 
State v. Ortega. 418 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1988) 5 
State v. Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969). . 17 
State v. Singh. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 
1991) passim 
State v. Verlarde. 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986) 13 
Watters v. Ouerrv. 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981) 11 
• » 
1 1 
RULES AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah R. App. 46 18 
Utah R. App. 48 2 
Utah R. App. 49 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13) 5, 6, 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133(1) 15, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-404(1) 5, 6, 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(5) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-104 (1) (a) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-lll(c) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-401(l) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 12, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 8, 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 17, 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1002 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 2 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHANNON S. SINGH, : 
Supreme Court 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 
v. : 
Court of Appeals 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : Case No. 900497-CA 
Respondent/Appellee. : Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Does the forgery statute incorporate the elements of 
"legal efficacy" or completeness into its provisions? (Does an 
incomplete and facially invalid driver's permit constitute a 
"writing" for purposes of the forgery statute?) 
Did the lower court err in forcing the jury to choose 
between a forgery conviction or a complete acquittal when the 
forgery charge may not have been applicable and Petitioner's other 
requested instructions were more specifically tailored for the 
involved conduct? (Should Petitioner have been allowed to instruct 
the jury on attempted forgery, prohibited use of a license, and 
theft by receiving stolen property?) 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The court of appeals' decision, State v. Singh. 171 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1991), is attached to this petition as 
Appendix 1. 
JURISDICTION 
On October 15, 1991, the court of appeals issued State v. 
Sinah, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1991). See Appendix 1. 
Petitioner Singh filed this petition within the designated 30 day 
time period and pursuant to the applicable rules. Utah R. App. 
P. 48(a); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1991) ("The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review 
of a Court of Appeals adjudication, . . . " ) ; see also Utah R. App. 
P. 49(a)(6) (D). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutory provisions 
and rules are contained in Appendix 2: 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 11, 1990, following a two day trial,1 a jury 
convicted Channon S. Singh of five counts of forgery, all second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501(3)(a) 
(1990), with one count enhanced pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-8-1001, -1002 (1990) (habitual criminal), in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding. On August 10, 1990, Judge 
Moffat sentenced Mr. Singh to an indeterminate term of five years to 
life for Count I, the habitual criminal charge. Transcript of 
Sentencing Proceeding,2 dated August 10, 1990 [hereinafter MSTfl] 
at 6. The court also imposed four other indeterminate terms of one 
to fifteen years: one term ran concurrently with the habitual 
criminal sentence, the remaining three ran consecutively. (ST 
at 6-7). A $500.00 restitution order was also imposed. (ST at 7). 
1
 Prior to trial, Mr. Singh moved to quash the bindover 
to circuit court, alleging that there was insufficient evidence for 
trial. (R 22-26). He later moved to dismiss the Information for 
reasons similar to those stated in his motion to quash (the evidence 
revealed at the preliminary hearing would not satisfy each element 
of forgery). (R 31-38). Mr. Singh renewed his motion before trial, 
(T 2-18), and again, following the State's case-in-chief. (T 81; 
110-18). The court rejected these motions and his exceptions to the 
jury instructions. See State v. Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
2
 The record cite, (R 159), is one bound document 
containing three separate transcripts: (1) the two day trial 
proceeding began on July 10, 1990; (2) followed by the March 30, 
1990, motion to quash proceeding; (3) and ending with the August 10, 
1990, sentencing proceeding. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Singh agrees with the statement of facts set forth in 
the court of appeals opinion. See Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 39-40 (Utah App. 1991). In brief, Channon Singh sold undercover 
officers temporary driver's permits which "bore an examination test 
score, an expiration date, and signatures purporting to be those of 
an examiner and the director of the Driver License Division for the 
Department of Public Safety. The permits remained blank as to the 
name, height, weight, sex, eye color, and date of birth of the 
holder." 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39-40. In addition, when an officer 
asked Singh "how to fill out the missing information on the 
permits," Singh instructed the officer and thereafter boasted about 
its usefulness. See id. at 40. The officers only observed Singh 
mark on one of the permits; they did not know whether Singh had 
marked the other permits. (T 68); Appellant's opening brief at 3, 
7 n.2; Appellee's brief at 4. 
Also undisputed factually was the testimony of the 
involved officers who conceded that the incomplete licenses, in the 
form as sold to them, were invalid and could not be used. See 
(R 32); (T 68, 79); Appellant's opening brief at 3, 9; Appellee's 
brief at 5, 19; Appellant's reply brief at 5, 6, 7. The Singh 
opinion omitted this important fact, however, and similarly failed 
to acknowledge the notation on the involved licenses which read, 
"Not Valid Without Licensee's Signature." See State's Exhibits 1-3; 
Appendix 3. 
4 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
"LEGAL EFFICACY" OR THE REQUIREMENT OF APPARENT 
COMPLETENESS IS REQUIRED BY THE FORGERY STATUTE 
In State v. Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 
1991), the court first considered whether the forgery statute, Utah 
Code Ann. "section 76-6-501[,] incorporate[d] elements of legal 
efficacy and completeness." Id. at 40. This question of statutory 
construction was reviewed for correctness, with no particular 
deference afforded the trial court's decision. Id. 
"Legal efficacy," a term originating in common law, 
requires that the involved instrument be complete enough to evidence 
a legally enforceable right.3 See (R 32-34); Appellant's opening 
brief, Point I; State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1988) ("blank 
computer printed forms [driver's licenses], having no legal 
efficacy, are void on their face [as they] evidence no legally 
enforceable right and therefore have no capacity to deceive anyone 
concerning rights or liabilities affected by government"). Utah's 
Code may not expressly list legal efficacy in its forgery statute,4 
3
 Petitioner Singh does not contend that in order to be 
"complete," every "i" must be dotted or every "t" must be crossed. 
Rather, the writing must at least appear complete enough to be a 
symbol "of value, right, privilege, or identification." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501(2); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13); Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-404(1); State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1988). 
4
 The applicable sections of the forgery statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501, reads: 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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but the crime of forgery nevertheless requires the involved 
"writing" to symbolize something "of value, right, privilege, or 
identification." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2). No rights or 
privileges attach to an invalid license.5 
Because the State classified the forgeries as second 
degree felonies, (R 102, 104, 106, 108, 110); (T 14); it was also 
required to prove that the writing was (or purportedly had been) 
4 -[footnote continued]-
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating 
a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of another, . . . " 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing 
or any other method of recording information,, checks, 
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, 
or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the 
writing is or purports to be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other 
instrument or writing issued by a government, or any 
agency thereof[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. 
5
 A symbol "of value, right, privilege, or 
identification[,]" as expressed in the forged writing definition, 
applies specifically to the involved temporary driver's permits. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13) ("'License' means the privilege 
issued under this chapter to operate a motor vehicle"); Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-404 (pertaining to the contents and specifications of an 
identification card). 
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"issued by a government, or any agency thereof[.]" Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501(3). In the case at bar, all the spaces identifying the 
licensee were left blank. See State's Exhibits 1-3; Appendix 3. 
Facially void, the arresting officers even admitted that the 
confiscated instruments were not useable in their present form as 
temporary driver's permits. (R 32); (T 68, 79). 
The numerous blank spaces made it apparent that the 
licenses had not been issued by the government, nor could a 
reasonable jury infer that the Division of Motor Vehicles would 
issue such a license to an individual and allow him or her to 
independently fill in the necessary information. £f. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-404(1) ("The commissioner shall issue a card of 
identification which provides all the information contained in the 
application, other than place of birth, and a photograph of the 
applicant and facsimile of the applicant's signature"). Absent 
completion of the pertinent identifying information, the partially 
completed licenses did not represent a symbol "of value, right, 
privilege, or identification." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2). No 
governmental "writing" therefore existed. 
The plain language of the permits also supports this 
conclusion. Conspicuously displayed on each license is the 
following notation: "Not Valid Without Licensee's Signature." See 
State's Exhibits 1-3; Appendix 3. As long as the licensee's 
signature line remains blank, the license cannot be considered 
governmentally issued. Hence, even if an authorized examiner and 
- 7 
director signed their names and filled in most of the information, a 
license lacking the licensee's signature would still be invalid. 
The notation expressly stated on the temporary permits is 
a requirement implicitly placed on other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification. A check, for example, would not yet 
symbolize an instrument of monetary value if it lacked the drawer's 
signature. Cf. Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-3-104(1)(a), 70A-3-401(l) 
(1980). Once the check is signed, however, it becomes bearer paper 
even if the remaining spaces (e.g. date, payee, and amount) are left 
blank. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-1-201(5), 70A-3-111(c). 
Completion of the signature line is an act vital to an instrument's 
symbolic value, an act giving the instrument legal efficacy. 
Thus, an unauthorized individual in possession of a 
government checkbook would not be guilty of forgery even if he 
transferred it to a third party and told the party how to complete 
it. Other statutory proscriptions may encompass such behaviors, see 
Point II, or situations in which the individual completed less 
essential blank spaces before transference, see, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-6-501 (attempted forgery), but the individual's 
actions would not amount to forgery. 
Petitioner did not, as the Singh opinion stated, argue 
merely "that, because the bogus permits were incomplete, they were 
not writings within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2)(a) 
(1990)." Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. In fact, Petitioner 
Singh concedes that an incomplete instrument may still fall under 
the forgery statute. The issue here, though, is whether the 
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involved permits were complete enough to constitute a "writing" 
symbolizing a governmentally issued "value, right, privilege, or 
identification." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2), -(3). As 
discussed above and as revealed by the permits themselves, the 
temporary licenses were not adequately completed. See Stated 
Exhibits 1-3; Appendix 3. 
Just as forgery does not apply to the transfer of a 
government checkbook—insufficiently completed but marked on 
nonetheless, so too should the crime not apply to the transfer of 
temporary driver's permits—predominately blank, admittedly still 
unuseable, and not yet legally efficacious. Other offenses more 
specifically proscribed such conduct. See infra Point II; Floyd v. 
Western Surgical Assocs., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989) ("Under 
general rules of statutory construction, where two statutes treat 
the same subject matter, and one statute is general while the other 
is specific, the specific provision controls"); Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984); cf. Helmuth v. 
Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1979) (a specifically designed 
provision [of the Controlled Substances Act] governs over the more 
generally restrictive forgery statute). 
Closely related to this issue is the Singh holding 
regarding the insufficiency of the evidence.6 The court found: 
6
 The standard of review for an insufficiency of the 
evidence argument is well established. "A jury conviction is 
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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The jury could reasonably have inferred that 
the permits purported to be government issued 
documents symbolizing identification and the 
privilege of operating motor vehicles on public 
highways. The jury could also reasonably have 
inferred that defendant transferred the permits 
fully contemplating their eventual fraudulent use of 
them. We therefore conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict defendant of forgery. 
Sinah. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41. 
At least for purposes of a forgery analysis, improperly 
intertwined in the Singh conclusion is the anticipated criminal 
involvement of another party. Even if Petitioner Singh transferred 
the permits and contemplated their eventual fraudulent use, the 
other party commits a forgery only after that party follows Singh's 
suggestions. Up until that time or until the essential blank spaces 
are completed, there would only be a transfer of nonlegally 
efficacious permits. No forgery occurred. But see Point II. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GIVEN 
Assuming, arguendo, the Singh opinion properly concluded 
that a "writing" issued by the government (the temporary driver's 
6 -[footnote continued]- viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 
1147 (Utah 1989). The "legal efficacy" argument, however, involves 
a question of law and is the premise upon which the insufficiency 
argument rests. Due to their overlapping nature, the arguments are 
addressed together rather than in separate subsections. 
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permits) may be devoid of information identifying the licensee, the 
trial court nonetheless erred when it refused to instruct the jury 
on Attempted Forgery, Prohibited Use of a license, and Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property. (T 110-18); (R 60-81). This issue 
presented a question of law and was reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Sinah, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 41 (Utah App. 1991) (citation 
omitted). 
The well-recognized general rule entitles a party to 
have his theory of the case submitted to the jury. 
Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's 
theory of the case, it is prejudicial error for the 
trial court to fail to instruct thereon. 
Nevertheless, the court cannot be said to have 
failed to properly instruct the jury when requested 
instructions are fully covered in other instructions 
given. 
Watters v. Ouerrv, 626 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Utah 1981) (footnotes 
omitted). 
Since the jury was given only one instruction in the 
trial court below, it was forced to choose between a forgery 
conviction or a complete acquittal. Apparently believing that 
Petitioner Singh had done something wrong, the jury opted for the 
conviction. But see State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986) 
("This is exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser included 
offense instructions are designed to avoid, and exactly the choice 
that the jury would not have had to make if [the lesser included 
offense] instruction had been given11); State v. BakerP 671 P.2d 152, 
157 (Utah 1983) ("where proof of an element of the crime is in 
dispute, the availability of the 'third option'—the choice of 
- 11 -
conviction of a lesser offense rather than conviction of the greater 
or acquittal—gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable 
doubt standard")• 
The instruction for a lesser included offense "must be 
given if (i) the statutory elements of greater and lesser included 
offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii) the evidence provides a 
'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.'" State 
v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (construing State v. Baker. 
671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) 
(1990). The two-pronged Baker analysis "should be liberally 
construed[,]" Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424, especially where, as here, 
the defendant requested the lesser included offense instruction.7 
A. The "Attempted Forgery" Instruction Should Have 
Been Given 
The Singh opinion erred in its consideration of "whether 
Baker required the trial court to instruct the jury on the offense 
of attempted forgery, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-501 and 76-4-102." State v. Singh. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 
7
 See also Point II.C. The prosecution must show more 
compelling circumstances than the defendant when it requests the 
lesser included offense instruction. State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 
424 n.5 (Utah 1986). Unlike the minimal standard place on the 
defendant, see id. at 424 ("the test is whether the elements overlap 
at all"), "when the prosecution seeks instruction on a proposed 
lesser included offense, both the legal elements and the actual 
evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must 
necessarily be included within the original charged offense." State 
v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in original). 
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41-42 (Utah App. 1991). Although the opinion noted initially that 
the forgery and attempted forgery offenses satisfied Baker's first 
prong, it erred subsequently in concluding that "the jury had no 
rational basis to acquit defendant of forgery and to convict him of 
attempted forgery.11 Id. at 42. The Singh court reasoned: 
Defendant argues that, because he left blank spaces 
in the permits, the jury may have believed that he 
"did not fully satisfy the act of forgery." 
Defendant's argument misapprehends the nature 
of his convictions. As the record discloses, he was 
not charged with forgery for creating forged driver 
permits. Defendant was charged and convicted for 
transferring the bogus permits. The only acts 
defendant was required to complete were the 
transfers of the permits. In this case, the bogus 
permits entered the undercover officers' hands as 
they left defendant's hands, and the transfers were 
then and there complete. Defendant presented no 
evidence at trial to dispute that these transfers 
occurred. Under the evidence presented, the jury 
had no rational basis to find that defendant did not 
actually transfer the permits. 
Singh. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42 (emphasis in original). 
As discussed above, it was not simply the existence of 
blank spaces that precluded the charge of forgery; rather, no 
forgery occurred because the blank spaces were material and 
essential to the permits' efficacy. See supra Point I. Regardless 
of whether the forgery convictions involved a "transfer" or 
"creation," there was no transfer of a "writing" as defined by the 
forgery statute. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501(2), -(3); see also 
State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986) ("in determining 
whether a rational jury could acquit on the greater charge and find 
- 13 -
guilt on the lesser charge, the court must view the evidence and the 
inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the defendant"). 
Indeed, if forgery required only a "transfer" of an 
instrument, Petitioner would have committed the crime without making 
a single marking or saying a word. By analogy, the Singh holding 
could impermissibly render the simple transfer of a stolen checkbook 
into a forgery. 
Moreover, the testimony of two State witnesses, 
Detectives Wright and Mays, provided a rational basis for acquittal. 
Both officers conceded that the partially completed licenses, in the 
form as sold to them, were not valid temporary permits. See (T 68); 
(T 79) (wherein Detective Mays testified that permits without 
"information as to the identity of the person" would not be valid); 
cf. (R 32) ("At the preliminary hearing Officer Holly Wright and 
Detective Carroll Mays testified that the partially completed forms 
were not useable as temporary permits"). The evidence provided the 
jury with a rational basis for finding that there were no transfers 
of (purported) symbols of "value, right, privilege, or 
identification." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2); see also State's 
Exhibits 1-3; Appendix 2 (the notation displayed on each permit is 
"Not Valid Without Licensee's Signature") ; cj£. State v. Brown, 694 
P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984) (if the jury could have accepted evidence 
concerning a lesser included offense, "however unlikely that might 
have been," it was error to refuse the instruction). 
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Both prongs of the Baker test were met. The court should 
have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted 
forgery. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3) (a) (,fNo defense to 
the offense of attempt shall arise . . . [b]ecause the offense 
attempted was actually committed . . . f f ) ; accord State v. Burks, 29 
Utah 2d 378, 510 P.2d 532 (1973). The jury could have properly 
viewed Petitioner Singh's actions as only constituting a 
"substantial step" toward the crime of forgery. 
B. The "Prohibited Use of a License" Instruction 
Should Have Been Given 
Assuming legal efficacy is not also incorporated into the 
definition of a license, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13); see supra 
note 5 and accompany text, Baker's two-pronged test was similarly 
met for the Prohibited Use of a License Instruction. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-133(1). The statute states, "It is a class B misdemeanor for 
a person to . . . display or cause to permit to be displayed or to 
have in possession any license knowing it is fictitious or has been 
canceled, denied, revoked, suspended, disqualified, or altered[.]" 
Id. The forgery statute similarly requires, inter alia, that a 
person act with the purpose to defraud or facilitate a fraud. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1). The trial court acknowledged the 
applicability of the omitted offense: 
[The State]: We couldn't charge under that statute 
[Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133], Judge. 
The Court: You could have under (1). You could 
have charged under 41-2-133. It's a misdemeanor for 
a person to display or cause or permit to be 
- 15 -
displayed or to have in possession any license 
knowing it is fictitious, [you] could have charged 
under that if you had wished to. 
What you're saying is, you charged under the 
fraud statute because you had the transfer. 
[The State]: And the additional element raised it 
to this charge [forgery]. 
(T 18) . 
The concerns regarding a transfer were irrelevant. Even 
if the greater offense includes additional elements, the lesser 
offense may still be included. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1986) ("the test is whether the elements overlap at all"); 
State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983) ("where two offenses 
are related because some of their statutory elements overlap, and 
where the evidence at the trial of the greater offense includes 
proof of some or all of those overlapping elements, the lesser 
offense is an included offense under [Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402] (3) (a),f) . Consequently, Baker's first prong was 
satisfied and, as noted previously, the second prong was also met. 
See supra Point II.A. 
In the alternative, Petitioner also argued that the 
"Prohibited Use of a License" instruction was more specifically 
tailored for the involved conduct than the generally worded forgery 
statute. (T 14-16, 115); Appellant's opening brief at 19 n.7; 
Appellant's reply brief at 7-8; compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133 
with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501; Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 
(Utah 1979); Floyd v. Western Surgical Assocs., 773 P.2d 401, 404 
(Utah App. 1989); Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 
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214, 216 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 
P.2d 146 (1969), Contrary to the position of the Singh opinion, 
Petitioner's requested instruction was not an attempt to "misapply 
the law" or "[subvert] the second prong of the Baker test." State 
v. Sinah. 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 42 (Utah App. 1991). Rather, 
Petitioner simply sought to give the jury another instruction for 
its consideration. Cf. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 
(1973) (emphasis in original) ("Where one of the elements of the 
offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly 
guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in 
favor of conviction"). 
C. The "Theft by Receiving Stolen Property" 
Instruction Should Have Been Given 
The Singh opinion declined to consider whether "the trial 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of theft 
by receiving stolen property, a third degree felony under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-408." Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42 n.2. It 
contended that the argument was raised for the first time on appeal. 
Id. Mr. Singh, however, expressly preserved this argument at trial, 
see (T 110-12) (attached as Appendix 4); (R 60-61); he listed the 
appropriate citations in his brief, see Appellant's opening brief 
at 5, 11, 17-18; and his objections were recognized fully by the 
State. See Appellee's brief at 18-19 n.10. 
For reasons similar to those discussed above, the theft 
by receiving stolen property instruction should have been given to 
the jury. "A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
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disposes of the property of another . . . or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding any such property from the owner, knowing 
the property to be stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1). The generally worded 
forgery statute requires that a person act with the purpose to 
defraud or facilitate a fraud. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1). The 
overlapping element of fraudulent conduct thus satisfied the first 
prong. Baker's second prong was also satisfied. See Point II.A. 
REASONS JUSTIFYING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
Utah's supreme court has not squarely addressed whether 
forgery contains the element of "legal efficacy." See Utah R. App. 
P. 46(d). Although forgery occurs often, an instrument's efficacy 
has not previously been questioned because of the apparent 
sufficiency and completeness of the involved document. The 
circumstances of this case properly raise such an issue. 
More importantly, the Singh opinion's rejection of 
Petitioner's proposed jury instructions conflicts directly with this 
Court's past mandates regarding forced jury verdicts, specific 
provisions governing over generally worded statutes, and lesser 
included offenses. See Utah R. App. P. 46(b). Despite its 
reference to Baker's two-pronged test, the Sinah opinion misapplied 
the noted standard. At the very least, the jury should have been 
able to consider the "attempted forgery" instruction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner Singh respectfully requests that this Court 
grant his petition for writ of certiorari and review the issues 
addressed herein. 
SUBMITTED this 1^ day of November, 1991. 
-£". 
RONALD S.v FUJINO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CH&RLI 
Attorney fof Appellant/Petitioner 
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OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Channan S. Singh appeals from a conviction 
of five counts of forgery, ail second degree 
felonies under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
501(3Xa) (1990), and one count of being a 
habitual criminal under Utah Code Ann. §76-
8-101 (1990). Defendant challenges the suf-
ficiency of the evidence, and the trial court's 
refusal to instruct the jury on lesser included 
offenses. We affirm. 
FACTS 
' On November 27, 1989, West Valley City 
detective Holly Wright, working undercover 
with the Metro Sting Unit, followed an info-
rmant's tip to a West Valley City residence to 
buy a driver's license from Bobby Sanchez. 
When Detective Wright arrived, Sanchez was 
not at the residence, but defendant, Channan 
S. Singh, was present. Defendant sold two 
partially completed Driver License Temporary 
Counter Permits to Detective Wright for one 
hundred dollars. Each permit bore an exami-
nation test score, an expiration date, and sig-
natures purporting to be those of an examiner 
and the director of the Driver License Division 
for the Department of Public Safety. The 
permits remained blank as to the name, 
PE REPORTS 
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height, weight, sex, eye color, hair color, and 
date of birth of the holder. 
^Subsequently, on December 7, 1989, Dete-
ctive Wright visited defendant's apartment in 
Salt Lake City, where she purchased two more 
of the partially completed permits from defe-
ndant for one hundred dollars. When Detec-
tive^Wright asked defendant how to fill out 
the^missing information on the permits, he 
told her to print her name and address on the 
forms. When Detective Wright informed def-
endant that she did not want to use her real 
name because warrants had been issued for 
her arrest, defendant said: "Then put down 
any name you want." Defendant also instru-
cted Detective Wright to make up a nine-
digit number and write it in the space for the 
license number. 
On December 12, 1989, Detective Wright 
again met with defendant, this time at the 
undercover sting location, to purchase more 
temporary driver permits. Detective Wright 
informed defendant that she did not have the 
money for the permits, but that her brother, 
Chance, would arrive later to make payment. 
Chance was another undercover officer, Det-
ective Carroll Mays, of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department. Defendant left fifteen 
blank permits at the sting location and retu-
rned later to collect payment. 
Defendant told Detective Mays that he 
normally sold the permits for fifty dollars 
each, but that he was willing to sell all fifteen 
for four hundred dollars. He assured Detective 
Mays that, when completed, the permits 
worked well as identification, boasting that he 
himself had used one after being pulled over 
and had encountered "no problems." Detective 
Mays told defendant that he planned to resell 
the permits to others, but that he was reluc-
tant to buy them because he did not know 
how to finish filling them out. Defendant then 
demonstrated how to fill in the director's and 
examiner's signatures, as well as examination 
results, on one of the permits. As defendant 
filled out the permit, he told Detective Mays 
to place the official signatures as he had, and 
to fill in the identifying information for the 
eventual purchasers. 
Defendant was later arrested and charged 
with five counts of forgery, a second degree 
felony, for transferring a writing which pur-
ported to be a government issued license. 
Defendant was also charged with being a 
habitual criminal. 
At the preliminary hearing, defendant 
moved to quash the bindover order and 
dismiss all charges on the ground that the 
driver permits were facially incomplete and 
thus incapable of facilitating a fraud within 
the meaning of the forgery statute. Defendant 
also argued that he should have been charged 
under the motor vehicle code for prohibited 
use of a license, rather than forgery. Prior to 
- * i M _ ^ ^ : itt*A ir\ Hicmics t h e 
information on the same grounds. At trial, 
defendant requested the court to instruct the 
jury on the alleged lesser included offenses of 
attempted forgery and prohibited use of a 
license. The trial court refused to give the 
requested instructions, and defendant was 
convicted on all counts. 
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) there 
was insufficient evidence to convict him of 
forgery under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 
(1990), and (2) the trial court erred in refusing 
to instruct the jury on the lesser offenses of 
attempted forgery, prohibited use of license, 
and theft by receiving stolen property.1 
%
* STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
Defendant argues that, because the bogus 
driver permits were incomplete, they were not 
writings within the meaning of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-50 l(2)(a) (1990). Therefore, 
the evidence was legally insufficient to estab-
lish that he transferred forged writings under 
the forgery statute. '" ' I 
The forgery statute specifies that a person is 
guilty of forgery if the person, with intent to 
defraud, transfers a writing purported to be 
the act of another. Utah Code Ann. §76-6r 
501 (1990). A writing can include "printing or 
any other method of recording information 
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit card£ 
badges, trademarks, money, and any other 
symbols of value, right, privilege, or identify 
cation." Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (2)(aj 
(1990). i% 
Before we consider the sufficiency of the 
evidence upon which defendant was convicted^ 
we consider defendant's argument that section 
76-6-501 incorporates elements of legal 
efficacy and completeness. ••&&' 
"We review for correctness a trial court^ 
statutory interpretation, according it no part-
icular deference." State v. Jaimez, 167 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 21, 24 (Utah App. 1991); State F* 
Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah Ap£ 
1991)(citations omitted). " ^ 
In construing a legislative enactment, this 
court's primary responsibility is "to give effect 
to the intent of the legislature." Stare v. Jooes^ 
735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987). WhffC 
statutory language is clear and unambiguous 
we will not look further to divine legislative 
intent, but will construe the statute according 
to its plain language. 
Adv. Rep. at 24. 
Despite defendant's efforts to add add-^ 
onal elements to the statute, we find section^ 
6-501(2) to be clear and unambiguous.. 
Nothing in that section, or any other sectwg 
of the forgery statute, suggests that the te&£ 
lature intended that an instrument be legw 
effective or complete in order to constitute^ 
writing. In view of the plain language °f .IS? 
Code Ann. §76-6-501, we conclude J * 
defendant's interpretation is untenable.
 t':^4r 
Id.; Jaimez, 167 Utah 
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
We now consider defendant's argument that 
the State failed to present evidence sufficient 
to convict him of the crime of forgery. 
Our standard in reviewing a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence when a defendant 
jias been convicted in a jury trial is well-
established: 
[T]he evidence and the reasonable 
inferences which may be drawn 
therefrom must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. A jury conviction is reve-
rsed for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inhere-
ntly improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 
1989)(citations omitted). 
In this case, defendant asserts that the State 
bailed to present evidence sufficient to prove 
that he transferred symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification, that is, writings 
within the meaning of the statute. However, 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, we find that sufficient 
evidence was presented to establish the elem-
ents of forgery. 
In this case, the evidence was neither inco-
nclusive nor improbable. Defendant did not 
contest having sold the temporary driver 
permits to Detectives Wright and Mays. Nor 
did he offer any evidence controverting any of 
the State's evidence. At trial, the two detect-
ives described three separate occasions on 
which they purchased such permits from def-
endant. Both detectives testified that the 
permits were identical to Utah Driver License 
Temporary Counter Permits, except that ide-
ntifying information and, on some permits, 
the director's and examiner's signatures 
remained to be inserted. Detective Wright 
testified that defendant instructed her on how 
to fill in the identifying information so she 
could use the permit herself. Detective Mays 
testified that defendant instructed him on how 
to fill out the director's and examiner's sig-
natures and examination results so that Dete-
ctive Mays could resell the permits to others 
for identification purposes. Moreover, Detec-
tive Mays testified of defendant's boast that 
he had sold many such permits to people who 
regularly used them for identification, and he 
testified that defendant even bragged that he 
had successfully used one himself during a 
traffic stop. Finally, the permits which defe-
ndant sold to Detectives Wright and Mays 
were admitted into evidence and the jury was 
given an opportunity to inspect them. 
UTAH 
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The jury could reasonably have inferred that 
the permits purported to be governme^ issued 
documents symbolizing identification and the 
privilege of operating motor vehicles on public 
highways. The jury could also reasonably have 
inferred that defendant transferred the permits 
fully contemplating their eventual fraudulent 
use of them. We therefore conclude that the 
evidence was sufficient to convia defendant of 
forgery. 
INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSES 
Finally, we consider defendant's claim that 
the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury on lesser included offenses. Defendant 
argues that the trial court erred in refusing his 
requests to instruct the jury on the offenses of 
attempted forgery and prohibited use of a 
license.2 He also argues that by this refusal, 
the court prevented him from presenting his 
theory of the case to the jury. 
An appeal challenging the trial court's 
refusal to give requested jury instructions 
presents questions of law. State v. Perdue, 813 
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991). Therefore, 
we review the trial court's determinations for 
correctness and accord them no particular 
deference. Id.; State v. Jaimez, 167 U* * Adv. 
Rep. 21, 24 (Utah App. 1991). 
When a defendant requests that th iry be 
instructed on lesser included offenses, we 
apply a two-tier 'evidence-based standard* 
to determine whether the requested instruct-
ions should be given. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152, 159 (Utah 1983). Under that standard, 
two conditions must be satisfied before a trial 
court is required to give the requested instru-
ctions: (1) the statutory elements of the 
offense charged must overlap with those ;>f the 
included offenses; and (2) the evidence 
adduced at trial must provide a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him or her of 
the included offense. Id. at 158-59. The first 
prong of the Baker analysis is essentially a 
mechanical, side-by-side comparison of the 
statutorily defined elements of the crimes. 
The second prong of the BaJcer analysis 
requires the court, without judging the credi-
bility of the evidence presented, to determine 
"whether there is a sufficient quantum of 
evidence presented to justify sending the que-
stion to the jury." Id. at 159. If the evidence 
presented would enable a jury to acquit on the 
crime charged, and to convict on the lesser 
offense, the question should be submitted to 
the jury, and the instruction should be given. Id. 
This prong is designed to preserve the 
jury's privilege of assessing the credibility of 
evidence and yet protect that weighing process 
from "red herrings." Id. 
We first consider whether Baker rec :red 
the trial court to instruct the jury . the 
offense of attempted forgery, a third degree 
{CF RFPOPTQ 
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felony under Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-501 
and 76-4-102. The first prong of the test is 
satisfied because the elements of forgery and 
attempted forgery necessarily overlap. With 
respect to the second prong, the question is 
whether the jury could have acquitted defen-
dant of forgery and convicted him of attem-
pted forgery under the facts proved at trial. Id 
at 159. Defendant argues that, because he 
left blank spaces in the permits, the jury may 
have believed that he "did not fully satisfy the 
act of forgery." 
Defendant's argument misapprehends the 
nature of his convictions. As the record disc-
loses, he was not charged with forgery for 
creating forged driver permits. Defendant was 
charged and convicted for transferring the 
bogus permits. The only acts defendant was 
required to complete were the transfers of the 
permits. In this case, the bogus permits 
entered the undercover officers' hands as they 
left defendant's hands, and the transfers were 
then and there complete. Defendant presented 
no evidence at trial to dispute that these tra-
nsfers occurred. Under the evidence presented, 
the jury had no rational basis to find that 
defendant did not actually transfer the 
permits. Therefore, the jury had no rational 
basis to acquit defendant of forgery and to 
convict him of attempted forgery. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court 
should have instructed the jury on attempted 
forgery because "the jury still may have con-
sidered the blank spaces significant enough to 
acquit [defendant] of forgery had the lesser 
included offense of attempted forgery been 
available." This argument suggests that the 
trial court should have given the jury the 
opportunity to misapply the law. The argu-
ment ignores the important principle of cons-
istency in the application of the law, and 
subverts the second prong of the Baker test. 
We conclude that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of 
attempted forgery. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court 
was required to instruct the jury on the 
offense of prohibited use of a license, a class 
B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §41-
2-133. Under Baker, the trial court was 
required to give the instruction only if there 
was a rational basis for the jury to acquit 
defendant of forgery and to convict him of 
prohibited use of a license. Baker, 671 P.2d at 
1^9. The prohibited use of a license statute 
proscribes the display or possession of a 
license that is known to be fictitious, canceled, 
denied, revoked, suspended, disqualified, or 
altered. Utah Code Ann. §41-2-133 (Supp. 
1991). 
In this case, the State presented uncontro-
verted evidence that defendant sold bogus 
driver permits to undercover detectives. Nat-
urally, incident to his sale and transfer of the 
permits, defendant possessed and displayed 
CoD£«Co 
them to the detectives. However, defendant 
presented no evidence to challenge the fact 
that he transferred the permits to the detect-
ives, and no other explanation for the fact 
that he possessed and displayed those permits. 
Under the evidence presented at trial, the jury 
rationally could not have acquitted defendant 
of forgery and still convicted him of prohib-
ited use of a license. In fact, in the context of 
this case, rather than a lesser included offense, 
prohibited use of a license could have consti-
tuted an additional offense. 
Finally, although a defendant is "entitled to 
have the jury instructed on the law applicable 
to its theory of the case if there is any reaso-
nable basis in the evidence to justify it," State 
v. Torres, 619 P.2d.694, 695 (Utah 1980); State 
v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 
1989), such instruction must still measure up 
to the requirements of Baker, which it did not 
do. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court 
did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on 
additional offenses. 
Affirmed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in 
refusing to give his instructions because he is enti-
tled to give the jury his theory of the case. This 
argument is incorporated in defendant's lesser inc-
luded offenses argument because every defendant 
who requests an instruction for a lesser-included 
offense is essentially requesting an instruction refl-
ecting his or her theory of the case. 
2. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of theft 
by receiving stolen property, a third degree felony 
under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408. Because 
defendant raises this argument for the first time on 
appeal, we do not consider it. State v. Valdcz, 432 
P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1967). 
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41-2-102. Definitions. 1 
As used in this chapter: . J | 
(1) "Cancellation" means the termination by action of the division ofB 
license issued through error or fraud or for which necessary consent ha£ 
been withdrawn. .. jdj 
(2) "Class D license" means the class of license issued for vehicles noffl 
defined as commercial vehicles or motorcycles under this title. (E 
(3) "Class M license" means the class of license issued for a motorcycled 
as defined under this chapter. m 
(4) "Commercial driver license (CDL)" means a license issued substanJ 
tially in accordance with the requirements of Title XII, Pub. L. 99-5701 
the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, and in accordance with] 
Part 7, Chapter 2, Title 41, which authorizes the holder to drive a class ofl 
commercial motor vehicle. jfl 
(5) (a) "Commercial motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle designed o n 
used to transport passengers or property if the vehicle: m 
(i) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more poundsj 
or a lesser rating as determined by federal regulation; ••9 
(ii) is designed to transport more than 15 passengers, include 
ing the driver; or m 
(iii) is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be j 
placarded in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 172, Subpart F J 
(b) The following vehicles are not considered a commercial motor]! 
vehicle for purposes of Part 7, Chapter 2, Title 41, the Uniform ComJI 
mercial Driver License Act: lm 
(i) equipment owned and operated by the United States De-1 
partment of Defense when operated by any active duty military] 
personnel and members of the reserves and national guard on J 
active duty including personnel on full-time national guard duty, j 
personnel on part-time training, and national guard military 1 
technicians and civilians who are required to wear military uni-jj 
forms and are subject to the code of military justice; h i 
(ii) vehicles controlled and operated by a farmer to transport] 
agricultural products, farm machinery, or farm supplies to or 2 
from a farm within 150 miles of his farm but not in operation a s ] 
contract or common motor carrier; ' g 
(iii) Orefighting and emergency vehicles; and fi 
(iv) recreational vehicles that are not used in commerce and. i 
are operated solely as family or personal conveyances for recrea-j 
tional purposes. *M 
(6) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of the Department of Pub-^J 
lie Safety. ~m 
(7) "Denial" or "denied" means the withdrawal of a driving privilege by » 
the division to which the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 12a, Title 41,'S 
Proof of Owner's or Operator's Security, do not apply. . , j | 
(8) "Disqualification" means either: M 
(a) the suspension, revocation, cancellation, denial, or any other • 
withdrawal by a state of a person's privileges to drive a commercial j | 
motor vehicle; i f 
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(b) a determination by the Federal Highway Administration, un-
der 49 C.F.R. Part 386, that a person is no longer qualified to operate 
a commercial motor vehicle under 49 C.F.R. Part 391; or 
(c) the loss of qualification which automatically follows conviction 
of an offense listed in 49 C.F.R. Part 383.51. 
(9) "Division" means the Driver License Division of the Department of 
Public Safety. 
(10) "Drive" means: 
(a) to operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle upon a 
highway; and 
(b) in Subsections 41-2-715(1) through (3), Subsection 41-2-715(5), 
and Sections 41-2-716 and 41-2-717, the operation or physical control 
of a motor vehicle at any place within the state. 
(11) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used pri-
marily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and 
other implements of husbandry. 
(12) "Highway" means the entire width between property lines of every 
way or place of any nature when any part of it is open to the use of the 
public, as a matter of right, for vehicular traffic. 
(13) "License" means the privilege issued under this chapter to operate 
a motor vehicle. 
(14) "License certificate" means the evidence of the privilege issued 
under this chapter to operate a motor vehicle. 
(15) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle and every vehi-
cle propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but 
not operated upon rails, except motorized wheel chairs and vehicles 
moved solely by human power. 
(16) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, hav-
ing a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with not 
more than three wheels in contact with the ground. 
(17) "Nonresident" means a person who is not a resident of this state 
and who has not sojourned or engaged in any gainful occupation in this 
state for an aggregate period of 60 days in the preceding 12 months and 
also every person who is temporarily assigned by his employer to work in 
Utah. 
(18) "Operate" means to be in actual physical control of a motor vehi-
cle. 
(19) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle. 
(20) "Owner" means a person other than a lienholder having an inter-
est in the property or title to a vehicle. The term includes a person enti-
tled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in 
another person but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as secu-
rity. 
(21) "Person" means every natural person, firm, partnership, associa-
tion, or corporation. 
(22) "Reportable violation" means an offense required to be reported to 
the Driver License Division as determined by the division and includes 
those offenses against which points are assessed under Section 41-2-128. 
(23) "Revocation" means the termination by action of the division of a 
licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
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41-2-111. Temporary learner permit — Instruction permit 
— Commercial driver instruction permit 
(1) (a) The division upon receiving an application for a class D or M license 
from a person 16 years of age or older may in its discretion issue a tempo-
rary learner permit after the person has successfully passed all parts of 
the examination not involving the actual operation of a motor vehicle, 
(b) The temporary learner permit allows the applicant, while having 
the permit in his immediate possession, to operate a motor vehicle upon 
the highways for six months from the date of the application in confor-
mance with the restrictions indicated on the permit as determined by 
rules of the division. 
(2) The division upon receiving an application may in its discretion issue an 
instruction permit effective for one year to an applicant who is enrolled in a 
driver education program that includes practice driving if the program is 
approved by the State Office of Education even though the applicant has not 
reached the legal age to be eligible for a license. The instruction permit enti-
tles the permittee when he has the permit in his immediate possession to 
operate a motor vehicle, only when an approved instructor is occupying a seat 
beside the permittee. 
41-2-133- Prohibited uses of license — Penalty. 
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to: 
(1) display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have in possession 
any license knowing it is fictitious or has been canceled, denied, revoked, 
suspended, disqualified, or altered; 
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a license issued to him, by a 
person not entitled to it; 
(3) display or to represent as his own a license not issued to him; 
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the division upon demand any license 
which has been denied, suspended, disqualified, canceled, or revoked; 
(5) use a false name or give a false address in any application for a 
license or any renewal or duplicate of the license, or to knowingly make a 
^Jajsezstatemeat^or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise 
<^commit a fraucto^ the application; or 
^^(C) peiTGrTany other prohibited use of a license issued to him. 
41-2-404- Identification card — Contents — Specifications. 
(1) The commissioner shall issue a card of identification which provides all 
the information contained in the application, other than place of birth, and a 
photograph of the applicant and facsimile of the applicant's signature. 
(2) The card shall be of an impervious material, resistant to wear, damage, 
and alteration- The size, form, and color of the card is prescribed by the 
commissioner. 
(3) At the applicant's request, the card may include a statement that the 
applicant has a special medical problem or allergies to certain drugs, for the 
purpose of medical treatment. 
(4) The card may also indicate the applicant's intent to make an anatomical 
gift, under the same procedure as provided for an operator license under 
Subsection 41-2-121(3). 
70A-1-201 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
PART 2 
GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 
Section 
70A-1-20L General definitions. 
70A-1-202. Prima facie evidence by third-party documents. 
70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith. 
70A-1-201 Time — Reasonable time — "Seasonably." 
70A-1-205. Course of dealing and usage of trade. 
70A-1-206. Statute of frauds for kinds of personal property not otherwise covered. 
70A-1-207. Performance or acceptance under reservation of rights. 
70A-1-208. Option to accelerate at will. 
70A-1-20L General definitions. Subject to additional definitions con-
tained in the subsequent chapters of this act which are applicable to spe-
cific chapters or parts thereof, and unless the context otherwise requires, 
in this act 
(1) "Action" in the sense of a judicial proceeding includes recoupment, 
counterclaim, setoff, suit in equity and any other proceedings in 
which rights are determined. 
(2) "Aggrieved party" means a party entitled to resort to a remedy. 
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in 
their language or by implication from other circumstances includ-
ing course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance 
as provided in this act (sections 70A-1 205 and 70A-2-208). Whether 
an agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provi-
sions of this act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts 
(section 70A-1103). (Compare "Contract") 
(4) "Bank" means any person engaged in the business of banking. 
(5) "Bearer" means the person in possession of an instrument, docu-
ment of title, or security payable to bearer or indorsed in blank. 
(6) "Bill of lading" means a document evidencing the receipt of goods 
for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of trans-
porting or forwarding goods, and includes an airbill. "Airbill" 
means a document serving for air transportation as a bill of lading 
does for marine or rail transportation, and includes an air consign-
ment note or air waybill. 
(7) "Branch" includes a separately incorporated foreign branch of a 
bank. 
(8) "Burden of establishing" a fact means the burden of persuading the 
triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than 
its nonexistence. 
(9) "Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good 
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation 
of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the 
goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of 
selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. All 
persons who sell minerals or the like (including oil and gas) at 
^ P " 3 ; . 1 . 0 4 - . F ° / f o f .ne?°tiable instruments - "Draft- - "Check" 
• "Certificate of deposit" — "Note." 
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this chapter must 
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum cer-
tain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or 
power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by 
this chapter, and 
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(d) be payable to order or to bearer. 
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is 
(a) a "draft" ("bill of exchange") if it is an order; 
(b) a "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on 
demand; 
(c) a "certificate of deposit" if it is an acknowledgment by a 
bank of receipt of money with an engagement to repay it; 
(d) a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit. 
(3) As used in other chapters of this act, and as the context may 
require, the terms "draft," "check," "certificate of deposit" and 
"note" may refer to instruments which are not negotiable within 
this chapter as well as to instruments which are so negotiable. 
70A-3-11L Payable to bearer. An instrument is payable to bearer 
when by its terms it is payable to 
(a) bearer or the order of bearer; or 
(b) a specified person or bearer, or 
(c) "cash" or the order of "cash," or any other indication which does 
not purport to designate a specific payee. 
70A-3-401. Signature. 
(1) No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears 
thereon. 
(2) A signature is made by use of any name, including any trade or 
assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used 
in lieu of a written signature. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode —: Included offenses-
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an ofifense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the ofifense charged and the included 
offense. An ofifense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the ofifense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an ofifense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the com-
mission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense, 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
76-4-102. Attempt — Classification of offenses. 
Criminal attempt to commit: 
K £ r°1pita l f e l o n y i s a {elony o f t h e firat degree; 
t w i ° n y ?^the fc^f* i s a ^ony of the second degree; except 
^ J M ? T 1 * Child U^aping' °r to COmmit ^ o l k o n T f Section 76-O-3011 or to commit any of those felonies described in Part 4 
°o( S& tot ( to^J WhlCh m fel0nieS °f the ** degree'is * «"* 
2 ! A S f y °J £ e !tC°^degree * a f e l o n y o f ** thir<* degree; 
4 A felony of the third degree is a class A misdemeanor; 
15) A class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor (6 A class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor (
 \ J i C ^sdemeanor is punishable by a penalty'not exceeding 
one half the penalty for a class C misdemeanor exceeding 
76-6-408, Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty-
CD Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be pun-
ishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
76-6-501. Forgery — '^ Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery i£ with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, comple-
tion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or ut-
terance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method 
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or iden-
tification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to 
be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing is-
sued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
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76-8-1001. Habitual criminal — Determination. 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for 
felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony of 
the second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would have 
been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of second degree, and 
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a felony of the 
second degree committed in this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state 
prison for from five years to life. 
76-8-1002. Habitual criminal — Procedure — Puni shment 
(1) In charging a person with being a habitual criminal, the information or 
complaint filed before the committing magistrate shall allege the felony com-
mitted within the state of Utah and the two or more felony convictions relied 
upon by the state of Utah. 
(2) If the defendant is bound over to the district court for trial, the county 
attorney shall in the information or complaint set forth the felony committed 
within the state of Utah and the two or more previous felony convictions 
relied upon for the charge of being a habitual criminal. If a jury is impaneled, 
it shall not be told of the previous felony convictions or charge of being a 
habitual criminal. The trial on the felony committed within the state of Utah 
shall proceed as in other cases. 
(3) If the court or jury finds the defendant guilty of the felony charged, then 
the defendant shall be tried immediately by the same judge and jury, if a jury 
was impaneled, on the charge of being a habitual criminal, unless the defen-
dant has entered or enters a plea of guilty to the charge of being a habitual 
criminal. 
(4) No conviction may be admissible to establish the status of a habitual 
78-2-2- Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to cany into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originate 
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer, 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capita] felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felon}*; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
KUie 40. considerat ions governing review 01 certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(a) Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the 
decision by the Court of Appeals. 
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a 
writ of certiorari which is jurisdictionally out of time. 
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for filing a petition for a 
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of 
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, a 
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the 
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial 
of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the rehear-
ing. 
Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order 
indicated: 
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is 
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Su-
preme Court contains the names of all parties. 
# (2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited. 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement 
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumenta-
tive or repetitious. General conclusions, such as '"the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The 
statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every sub-
sidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in 
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme 
Court. 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions 
issued by the Court of Appeals. 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is invoked, showing: 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and 
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of 
time within which to petition for certiorari; 
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and 
APPENDIX 3 
h 3 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Drivtr LictnM Ttmponry Counttr Permit 
CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO 
ADULT a MINOR D - " 
CLASS • MOTORCYCLE D 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
i 
8 
OAT6 . 19-
HEIGHT 
FT IN 
SEX 
RESTRICTION 
BIRTH DATE 
WEIGHT 
LBS. 
Stgnatix* 
&T7# 
EYES 
'/ 
OLO-50 (P-2Q23* P*v 2-«7 
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION 
NO RESULT 
££*. 
EXAMINER I 1 OATE ^ m-in 
-TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT 
Whtn COMPLETED *nd SIGNED by A ORIVER 
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY 
PERMIT TO 0R4VE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE 
YOUR PERMANENT Of^iVlR LICENSE 
EXPIRATION Di M-J-/9??\ 
EXAMINER 
p/vffe m- I.-IT, 
INSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PERMIT 
D THIS PERMIT ALLOWS YOU TO DRIVE A 
MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCEPT MOTOR-
CYCLES) WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY A 
LICENSED ORIVER ONLY 
D DRIVE A MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PAS-
SENGERS DA-UJGHT HOURS ONLY 
AND NOT Tfi OR^E ON MAJOR ROAOS 
EXPIRATION DATE 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Drivtr UctnM Temporary Counttr Permit 
DLO-50 (P-2023) Rmt 24 
d> 
/. 
&j4"t 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Driver Lictnst Temporary Counttr Ptrmit 
CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO. 
ADULT D MINOR • C 
CLASS D MOTORCYCLE D 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
3 
I 
DATE . 19. 
HEIGHT 
FT IN 
SEX 
RESTRICTION^ M 
BIRTH OATE 
WEIGHT 
LBS. 
EYES 
Z^fP 
DLO-50 <P-2Q23> *m. 2-«7 
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION 
NO. RESULT 
7W 22 
EXAMINER DATE 
- TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT 
Wtwn COMPLETED and SIGNED by A ORl VER 
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY 
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE 
YOUR PERMANENT DRIVER LICENSE. 
EXPIRATION DAfft /] /^y? V ^ s j ' 
EXAMINER m ±&d± 
INSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PERMIT 
• THIS PERMIT ALLOWS YOU TO DRIVE A 
MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCEPT MOTOR-
CYCLES) WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY A 
UCENSEO ORiVER ONLY. 
D DRIVE A MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PAS-
SENGERS. OAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY, 
ANO NOT Tp-QRIVE ON MAJOR ROADS. 
EXPIRATION OATE 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
<* Driver Lictntt Temporary Counttr Ptrmit 
U6d 
OLO-50 (P-2023) R»v. 2 
<£> 
0£/&fcg7 
n6<0 £&n / 
id)
 c 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Driver License Temporary Counter Permit 
OLO-50 (P-2023) R«v 2-«7 
CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO 
ADULT Q MINOR D 
C L A S S • MOTORCYCLE D 
NAME 
AOORESS 
OATE . 1 9 . 
HEIGHT 
FT IN 
SEX 
BIRTH OATE 
WEIGHT 
LBS. 
EYES 
RESTRICTION 
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION 
NO RESULT EXAMINER DATE 
X2T 
2M 
T< r 
TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT 
Wh«n COMPLETED and SIGNED by A DRIVER 
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY 
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE 
YOUR PERMANENT ORIVER LICENSE 
EXPIRATION OyfE 
EXAMINER "&SL&ZU 
aSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PER* 
D THISPE*M4lALLOWSYOj>*t>0RIVEA 
MOTOR VEMlfcfci^jp^EPT MOTOR-
CYCLES) WMEN>(CCbM^ANlED BY A 
LICENSED D^ER ONLY 
""" ORlVEy«r<lOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PA? 
<G£RS^DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY 
ANO NOfTOpRtV>pN MAJOR ROADS 
EXAMINER S 
EXPIRATION DATE 
APPENDIX 4 
t^ ifcEJ: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHANNAN SRAH SINGH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. SLP901900431 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
OF TRIAL 
* * * 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
J9 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
This cause came on to be heard before the 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, one of the Judges of the said 
Court, on July 10, 1990, and July 11, 1990, when and where 
the following proceedings were had. 
* * * 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant; 
MR. WILLIAM ALLBRIGHT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MR. CHARLES F. LOYD, JR. 
Attorney at Law 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
HAL M. WALTON 
Registered Professional Reporter 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
MR. ALLBRIGHT: No, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the bailiff was sworn at this time.) 
THE COURT; There are two verdict forms with each 
count, guilty, and a not guilty form, and they're in 
numerical order herein for your consideration. Around 
12:00 o'clock, the bailiff will come in and take your order 
and we'll get you some lunch. We'll bring it in. 
(Whereupon, the jury retired to the jury room at 
11:20 a.m.) 
THE COURT: We'll be in informal recess until 
the jury returns the verdict, and if you gentlemen wish, 
the reporter will take your exceptions to the instructions. 
MR. LOYD: The first instruction that was not 
given by the Court after the Court was requested to do so 
by defense counsel reads as follows: "A forgery is a 
writing which, if genuine, might be of legal efficacy." 
The citation for that is, that statement is an 
element of forgery and is from United States vs. McGovern, 
661 F.2D27 (3rd Circuit 1981) citing Gilbert vs. United 
State,', 307 U.S. 658 L.Gd 2nd 750 (1962). 
H Second instruction not given by the Court after 
** requested to do 30 by defense counsel reads as follows: 
23 "Before you can convict the defendant, CHANNAN SRAH SINGH, 
** of the crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property based 
*' on Counts I through V of the Information, you must believe 
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from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, 
each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That the offense occurred on or about the 
27th day of November, and the 7th and 12th day of December, 
1989, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That defendant, CHANNAN SRAH SINGH, acted 
with the purpose to deprive the owner of the property 
thereof, 
3. That said defendant, CHANNAN SRAH SINGH, did 
receive, retain, or dispose of the property of another, 
knowing that it had been stolen or believing that it 
probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds 
or aids in concealing, selling or withholding any such 
property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen. 
4. That the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250. 
If, after careful consideration of ail the 
evidence in this case, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
If, on the other hand, you are convinced of the truth of 
each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty 
of the offense of theft by receiving stolen property based 
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